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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: AMENDED
REGULATIONS CHANGE VALUATION FOR ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES
Changes in valuation regulations mean higher values and increased
taxes. The amendment itself and the concurrent T.I.R. absorb
much of the force of the changes.
UNDER CURRENT Internal Revenue Code provisions, both federal
estate and gift taxes are imposed on the value of the property
subject to the tax.1 Thus, valuative standards and techniques be-
come critical, valuation being the "key factor in the imposition of
estate tax and gift tax."2 Fair market value3 has long been the stan-
dard of valuation for the imposition of these taxes, 4 with negotiation
and compromise commonplace in agent-taxpayer dealings, although
pursuant to no statutory authorization. 5 The delimitation of the
relevant market to be used as a frame of reference in valuation has
never been precise, however. Prior to 1965, the Treasury Regula-
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031a, 2512a.
For the estate tax this value is determined as of the date of the decedent's
death, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2031, or on an alternate date which is generally
one year after the decedent's death; see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2032. For the
gift tax this value is determined as of the date of the gift. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 2512.
2 1 Mm TENS, FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, § 6.01, at 336 (1959).
8 The regulations define fair market value as follows: "the price at which
the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts .... [N]ot to be determined by a forced sale price ...
All relevant facts and elements of value as of the applicable valuation date shall
be considered in every case." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826,
1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 13 (estate tax). The gift tax regulation is sub-
stantially the same. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965
INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 15. The date on which fair market value is to be de-
termined is specified in §§ 2031, 2032, 2512 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. See note 1 supra.
This is the same willing buyer-willing seller approach to fair market value
that the courts have adopted. Estate of Fitts v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 729,
731 (8th Cir. 1956); Robertson v. Routzahn, 75 F.2d 537, 589 (6th Cir. 1985). In
addition, local tax assessments are not considered necessarily reliable in determin-
ing fair market value. Estate of Walter Lippincott, 27 B.T.A. 785, 740 (1938),
rev'd on other grounds, 72 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1984). Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031, 20.2512
(1964). See 2 BEVERIGE, FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION § 19.01, at 362 (1956). For
a general discussion of the fair market value concept see Gordon, What is Fair
Market Value?, 8 TAx. L. REv. 85 (1952).
'See 1 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 2, § 6.02 nn.3 & 5.5 Although negotiation and compromise are common methods of determining
value, courts seldom acknowledge the ad hoc nature of the process. See LOWNDS
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tions did not specify the type of market setting which was to be used
as a basis for determining fair market value. In June 1965, how-
ever, these regulations were amended and now specify that the fair
market value of an item is to be determined by its hypothetical sale
price in a market where such items are "most commonly sold to the
public."6 Thus, a retail and not a wholesale transaction has been
adopted as the relevant market test for items "generally obtained
by the public in the retail market." 7 An illustration provided by
the regulations demonstrates the distinction between this new
retail market test and the wholesale context: the value of a used
automobile will be the estimat ed price which the public would pay
to a used automobile dealer to obtain a similar automobile rather
than the price that a dealer would pay a private owner for such an
automobile."
The retail market test, with its resultant higher valuation of
property, is consistent with the two chiefly articulated justifications
for estate and gift taxation: production of revenue and reduction
& KRAiER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxES § 18.16 (2d ed. 1962); Powell, Estate
Valuation-The Internal Revenue Service Standpoint, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (1961).
The importance of these negotiations is emphasized by the presumption favoring
the ultimate valuation set by the Commissioner. "The Commissioner having
determined a valuation for the assessment of the estate tax, the taxpayer must
adduce legal, admissible, and convincing evidence of error to sustain his appeal."
Estate of Lucy H. Sturgess, 2 B.T.A. 69, 70-71 (1925).
For a study of judicial approach in cases involving contested valuation figures
see Bosland, Tax Valuation by Compromise, 19 TAx L. REv. 77 (1963). In one
case a dissenting judge pointed out the difficulty in finding a basis in legal rule
for determinations of valuation by the Tax Court when he noted that the court's
valuation figure of $375 was the arithmetic mean of the $150 figure proposed
by the taxpayer and the $600 figure set by the Commissioner. Estate of Fitts v.
Commissioner, 237 F.2d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
"Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to be determined by
the sale price of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most
commonly sold to the public .... " Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1 (b) (1958), as amended,
T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 13 (estate tax). The amended gift tax
regulations now contain a similar provision. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (195i8),
as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. Rv. BULL. No. 27, at 15.
T Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 (b), 25.2512-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT.
REv. BULL. No. 27, at 13 and 15.
In the past courts have suggested that even though the class of possible
buyers at retail is limited and small, the possibility of such a sale cannot be
discounted. Thus, in a gift tax case involving the valuation of expensive
diamonds, the court said: "While it may be true that the speediest and most
convenient way to dispose of a large diamond is by sale to an established dealer,
wholesale or retail, the possibility of a more favorable private sale cannot be
entirely eliminated." Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954).
8Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 (b), 25.2512-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT,
REV. BULL. No. 27, at 13, 15,
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of excessive accumulations of wealth.9 However, while rigid appli-
cation of the retail test would clearly further these ends, the Com-
missioner deemed it desirable in certain situations to partially
ameliorate the impact of the amendment with respect to estate taxa-
tion.10 Thus, where the estate sells an item of estate property to a
"dealer""' for less than fair market value, 2 the amount by which the
fair market value of the item exceeds the actual sale price to the
dealer is classified as an administrative expense and may be deducted
' See GLEASON & OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION AND THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 9 (4th ed. 1925); PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY 214-15 (1947); Eisenstein,
The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 228, 238 (1956).
For a general history of federal estate and gift taxation see BLAKEMORE & BAN-
CROFT, INHERITANCE TAX LAW 15-16 (1912); GREEN, THEORY AND PRAarCne OF
MODERN TAXATION 165 (1933); HUGHES, THE FED.AL DEATH TAX §§ 1, 231 (1938);
2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §§ 15.01-15.04 (1942); Eisenstein,
supra at 224-38.
Questions concerning fairness in the application of the federal estate and gift
taxes are often answered by the contention that such taxes are officially levies
on the privilege of transferring property. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256
U.S. 345, 348-50 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 56-61 (1900); Iglehart
v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704, 712 (5th Cir. 1935). "These federal taxes are im-
posed upon the transmission of property rather than upon its receipt, which sup-
ports an approach reflecting cost rather than immediate value to the donee."
STEPHENS & MARR, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 337 (1959). However, it
has been suggested that the truly fair method of valuation for such taxes would
be based on the value of the property to the recipient. "[T]he burden of the tax
falls upon the beneficiaries, even if the tax is paid by the executors out of the
estate as such. 'Value of the property' should therefore be interpreted to mean
(or to be the approximate index of) that value which is significant to the bene-
ficiaries-in short, a special form of the concept of 'value to the owner.' Clearly,
the worth of the estate to the decedent is of no consequence here. But equally
truly, its market value, in the strict sense of the price at which it might be sold
to any outside party, is irrelevant save as a possible measure of the value of the
property to those who inherit it." 2 BONBRIGIrT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY
694-95 (1937).
1 0 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053 (d)(2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 27, at 14. A similar provision was not included in the gift tax regu-
lations since no provision is made for deductions of expenses for that tax.
"1The term dealer is not defined in the estate tax regulation. Reference is
made to a dealer in the automobile example given to illustrate the retail market
test. See text accompanying note 8 supra. This may suggest the popular or
common usage of the term, denoting someone one step removed from the public
in the market structure. However, it is also possible that it has been used
in a technical sense. If "dealer" is to be regarded as a word of art, §§ 1.453-1 (a)
(dealers in personal property under the installment method), 1.471-5 (dealers in
securities) of the regulations may be of assistance in divining its proper inter.
pretation. Treas. Reg. § IA53-1 (a) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6682, 1963-2 Cot.
BULL. 197; Treas. Reg. § 1A71-5 (1958). Since no definition of a dealer was
proffered by the regulations and given the contextual use of the term in the
automobile example, it seems likely that the term has been used in its common
usage; that is, someone one step removed from the public in the market struc-
ture, such as the automobile dealer.
12 Fair market value is determined by §§ 20.2031-1 to -9 of the estate tax
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from the gross estate.13 Such a sale must be both bona fide and
"necessary in order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of admin-
istration or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution."'14
A further modification of the rigors of the retail market test
was provided by Technical Information Release 737, issued the day
following the release of the amended regulations.' 5 It prescribed
two situations where the sale price of an item disposed of by an
estate will be presumed to be its fair market value.' Thus, under
section 3 of the release the price obtained in a bona fide' 7 sale of
tangible personalty effected either at a public auction or initiated
through the use of classified newspaper advertisements will be pre-
sumed to be the relevant retail sales price for valuation purposes.' s
However, this presumption will be deemed applicable only where
there has been no "substantial change" in market conditions and
when the sale date "reasonably follows" the controlling valuation
date.19
regulation on either the date of the sale or the appropriate valuation date (as
determined by §§ 20.2031-1 or 20.2032-1) whichever date results in the lower
valuation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d)(2)(1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965
INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 14.
' The necessary sale expense deduction, at first glance simply a mitigation
of fair market value, is in substance of much greater significance since it creates
a new estate tax deduction. A necessary sale to a dealer may result in a paper loss when
the proceeds therefrom are compared to the fair market value of the items sold. This
hypothetical loss, however, is categorized as an administrative expense, which in turn is
allowed as a deduction. It is possible that this intricacy is required because of the ex-
clusive definition given to a deductible loss under the estate tax provisions
of the code. Losses deductible for estate tax purposes are enumerated, INT. REV.
CoDE OF 1954, § 2054, and selling losses are not mentioned.
11 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (d) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 27, at 14. (Emphasis added.)
I' T.I.R. 737, § 3, Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965 INT. REav. BuLL. No. 27, at 19.
16 Ibid.
17For the criteria for a bona fide sale see notes 50-52 infra and accompanying
text.
18 T.I.R. 737, § 3, Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 19.
10Ibid. The terms substantial change and reasonably follows are not clarified
in the regulations. Substantial change suggests a test based on particular circum-
stances in the market for the item under consideration. Reasonably follows is
likewise probably to be determined on an individual basis. The probable purpose
of these terms is to prevent the' creation of a third possible valuation date for
tangible personalty. Without such a requirement an executor might be able to
obtain favorable valuation by taking advantage of changed market conditions
for tangible personalty while still being able to select his overall valuation date
on the basis of other considerations. For a survey of the alternate valuation dates
which an executor may select as controlling, see note 1 supra. The "substantial
change" requirement would seem to preclude this option when there is a sudden
shift in market conditions, while the "reasonably follows" requirement will take
care of situations where there is a gradual and constant change.
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Given the pivotal importance of valuation, these alterations of
the relevant market concept are highly significant. 20 The language
of the amended regulations is imprecise in several particulars, 21
however, and a resolution of future problems inherent in the regu-
lation's ambiguities may be facilitated by viewing them in light of
traditional valuation methodology. Two approaches have been
previously utilized in resolving specific valuation problems. Refer-
ence may be made to valuation techniques employed in other legal
contexts, 22 or the inquiry may be restricted to the specific area of
valuation being examined. 23 Both approaches are valuable and the
practitioner may find it especially helpful to augment his specialized
research with forays into related areas.
A ready analogy to estate and gift valuation is afforded by the
income tax laws, where a determination of fair market value is like-
wise required in many situations. For example, the Internal Revenue
Code requires that the value of prizes and awards received by the
taxpayer be included in taxable income.24 Fair market value for
non-cash items so received is determined by ascertaining the amount
the taxpayer would have received had he sold the item.25 This
approach has occasionally been referred to as the "money's
worth" test.26  Similarly, the fair market value of a charitable
20 The importance of regulations identifying the market encompassed within
the term "fair market value" is emphasized by the general absence of case law
dealing with the type of market to be considered. However, several cases have
raised the point by implication where the money's worth test was rejected
in favor of the replacement cost test. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254
(1941); Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 924 (1954); Estate of Frank Miller Gould, 14 T.C. 414 (1950); notes 24, 27
infra.
21 See text accompanying notes 42-55 infra.
22 "An attorney faced with a question of valuation under the federal estate or gift
taxes should not hesitate to include in his research the federal income and excess
profits tax cases and rulings on valuation, and in addition state taxation cases, and
rate regulation, eminent domain and damage cases, state or federal, involving valuation
problems similar to his." LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 18.1, at 418.
2 "[I]n American law at least, both the concepts of value and the technique of its
proof are decidedly influenced by the specific purpose for which the valuation is made."
1 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 4-5. Therefore, the result has been that there are
"fundamental differences in substantive law-in the very meaning of the phrase 'value
of the property' as a legal objective." Id. at 5.
2 1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 74.
2 5 Lawrence W. McCoy, 38 T.C. 841 (1962), acq., 1963-1 Cur. Bu.L. 4 (value of
new car won in sales contest). But see Reginald Turner, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 464
(1954) (steamship tickets won in radio contest were given compromise valuation).
In neither case was the question of market specifically raised.
26 The "money's worth" test has been articulated as "what-you-could-have-got-for-
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contribution, deductible by the donor under section 170 of the
code 2 7 has been determined as the price that the article brought
when subsequently sold. 28  In both situations, however, the con-
flicting valuation techniques were the money's worth or seller's
test and the replacement cost or buyer's test, rather than the type
of market under consideration.
In the specific area of federal estate and gift taxation, the trend
in valuation has been toward the replacement cost approach, which
is occasionally referred to as the "buyer's test." In the first im-
portant valuation cases to consider this approach, the courts accepted
the contention of the Commissioner that insurance policies should
be valued at their replacement cost rather than at their cash sur-
render value as proposed by the taxpayer.29 The Commissioner's
view that the federal excise tax should be included when valuing
articles upon which such tax is imposed has also been judicially
accepted.3 0 A more recent indication of the trend toward replace-
ment cost came in 1963 when the Treasury specified that the value
of shares in an open-end mutual fund investment company will be
public offering price rather than redemptive value.31 Indeed, the
it-in-money-if-you-had-sold-it." Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.)
(Frank, J.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748 (1943).2 7 INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 170.
21 The best evidence of the fair market value of the goods was the price they
brought when sold shortly after being donated. Philip Kaplan, P-H T.C. REP'. DEC.
43.53, at 487 (Feb. 17, 1965), acq., 1965 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 34, at 6. Contra, Daniel
S. McGuire, P-H T.C. REP. DEC. 44.75 (Sept. 13, 1965) (valuation set between the
amount claimed by taxpayer and that allowed by the Commissioner). In neither of
these cases was there an inquiry into the nature of the relevant market. Rather, the
issue was whether the test to be applied was replacement cost, money's worth or some
other monetary standard.
20 Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U.S.
259 (1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941).
The replacement cost approach has also been adopted for annuity contracts.
"It is now settled that for estate tax purposes a valuation of annuity contracts based
on replacement cost at the date of death is proper and reasonable." Estate of John
L. Walker, 8 T.C 1107, 1111 (1947). Cf. Farha Schayek, 33 T.C. 629, 634-35 (1960)
(value of gift in trust is amount passing from donor, not amount received by donee);
E.T. 7, XIV-1 CuM. BuL. 382 (1935) (value of gift in trust includes trustee's com-
mission since value is the cost to the donor).
30 Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 256-57 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 924 (1954); Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 906 (1953). See 7 VAND. L. REv. 292 (1954). The Tax Court has articulated
the rationale underlying the replacement cost approach by saying in part: "If the
decedent had given his wife the money to buy this ring .... " Estate of Frank Miller
Gould, 14 T.C. 414, 417 (1950).
The Commissioner's position was stated in Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 110.
Present regulations continue this practice. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-7 (1958).
31 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-8 (b), 25.2512-6 (b) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6680, 1963-2
Cum. BuLL. 417, 419-20.
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amended valuation regulations are in part manifestations of the
Commissioner's favorable disposition toward replacement cost.32
The sole departure from the trend toward replacement cost
valuation in the estate and gift tax field is the blockage principle"8
currently recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. That prin-
ciple is employed in situations where the amount of the particular
security holding which is to be valued may be so large that an actual
sale in bulk of the securities would depress the market and thus
cause realization of a lower price per share than would otherwise
result. The blockage approach takes cognizance of this effect and
permits valuation at a lower hypothetical block sale price rather
than the market price of a single share.34 Application of the block-
age principle, then, results in utilization of the lower money's worth
test rather than the higher replacement cost standard. 5 In 1958,
after twenty years of resistance to this approach, 6 the Commissioner
The replacement cost approach is also used for valuation of stocks and bonds,
with their value determined by the selling price in the market. Treas. Reg. §§
20.2031-2 (b), 25.2512-2 (b) (1958). See Marks, Little-Publicized Valuation Regs Mean
Higher Estate and Gift Taxes, 22 J. TAxATioN 286 (1965).
" See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
"See LOWNDES & KRAMaRa, op. cit. supra note 5, § 18.26; Riecker, Blockage in
Federal Estate and Gift Tax Valuation, Mich. S.BJ., Aug. 1963, p. 24. For an ex-
cellent summary of the positions of both sides of the blockage question see Helvering
v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 62 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 689 (1942). The Treasury
contended that businesses do not use blockage in valuing their portfolios, that blockage
will frustrate the intent of Congress to levy a graduated tax, and that without a sale
there is no effect on the market at all. On the other hand, the taxpayer argued that
the size of the holding should be considered if the block of securities could not be
sold in a reasonable time without effecting the price. Ibid.
"' "If the executor can show that the block of stock to be valued is so large
in relation to the actual sales on the existing market that it could not be liquidated in a
reasonable time without depressing the market, the price at which the block could be
sold as such outside the usual market, as through an underwriter, may be a more
accurate indication of value than market quotations." Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (e)
(1958). The gift tax regulations contain a similar provision. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-2 (e)
(1958).
'5 In a recent case involving blockage, the value of the securities in question was
determined to be $84 a share rather than the market value of $87 a share as con-
tended by the Commissioner.
"The executors have shown that the block of 1,440 shares was of a size that would
have depressed the price of the stock on the market in the light of the volume of
trading occurring at the time of decedent's death and that the amount by which the
price would have been depressed reasonably approximated the cost of selling the
stock on a secondary basis. I find, consequently, that the fair market value of the
stock for estate tax purposes in this case was $84 a share." Estate of Bartol v. Mc-
Ginnis, 185 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
.8 A brief summary of the Commissioner's lack of success in opposing the blockage
principle is found in Helvering v. Maytag, 125 F.2d 55, 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
316 U.S. 689 (1942). The court comments on the "persistence of the Commissioner"
but states that "the decisions are unanimously against him." 125 F.2d at 63.
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accepted the principle and presently will permit use of the blockage
technique when its applicability is substantiated by the taxpayer.37
While valuation methods in both income taxation and generic
estate and gift taxation areas may in a given case afford a viable
analogy for problems arising under the retail market test, whole-
sale borrowing of these concepts is improper. For example, while a
sale to a dealer by an estate is not considered determinative in estab-
lishing fair market value under the amended estate tax regulations, 5
the actual price received from a sale to a dealer has been utilized in
valuing property for the charitable contribution deduction.3 9 This
divergence is explicable by the differing policy considerations in each
situation,40 but emphasizes the inherent difficulty of using the same
language in different tax regulations to achieve dissimilar objectives. 41
While the amended regulations do clarify the Commissioner's
position on valuation to the extent that they place determination of
fair market value in a retail market setting, they have also created
several interpretative problems. One complication is suggested
by the statement in the amendment to the effect that consideration
will be given to the geographic location of an item in determining
its fair market value.42 The degree to which market value has thus
37 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. Bu. 287.
38 While a sale to a dealer is not determinative of fair market value, a "necessary"
sale to a dealer qualifies for the necessary sale expense deduction. Treas. Reg. §
20.2053-8 (d) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 14.
30 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
40 For example, the objectives of the estate tax are to reduce the accumulation of
wealth and provide a source of revenue. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
A higher valuation will best accomplish this purpose. On the other hand, the income
tax is imposed on the amount "realized" by the taxpayer. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189, 211 (1920).
Moreover, policy objectives within the income tax field differ in some instances.
For example, since the income tax is a means of producing revenue, determination of
the amount of taxable income realized might be approached differently than valua-
tion of a deduction. Thus, the seemingly consistent application of the money's worth
test for the valuation of prizes and for charitable contributions may demonstrate
inconsistent policy decisions. In one instance the benefit of the lower valuation goes
to the taxpayer, in the other to the government. Compare Reginald Turner, 23 P-H
Tax Ct. Meri. 464 (1954), with Philip Kaplan, P-H T.C. REP. Drc. 43.53 (Feb. 17,
1965), acq., 1965 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 34, at 6.
41 A distinguished federal court of appeals justice has observed: "At the bottom
of respondents' contention is this implied assumption: The same transaction cannot be
a completed gift for one purpose and an incomplete gift for another. Of course, that
is not true, as the cases above cited make dear. Perhaps to assuage the feelings
and aid the understanding of affected taxpayers, Congress might use different symbols
to describe the taxable conduct in the several statutes, calling it a 'gift' in the gift
tax law, a 'gaft' in the income tax law, and a 'geft' in the estate tax law." Com-
missioner v. Estate of Beck, 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.).
'
2 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1 (b), 25.2512-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT.
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been localized is not specified and indeed may vary areally for each
type of article under consideration. 43 Consideration of location on
an article-by-article basis appears to be a more realistic approach to
the problem than an attempt to outline a general local market for
all items. A test might be suggested which defines the relevant
geographic area as that within which a reasonable seller would
operate in an attempt to dispose of the article in the retail market.
44
Utilizing this test, considerations of location might require lowering
the valuation of an item by an amount equal to the hypothetical
cost of shipping it to an area of greater demand where a higher
retail price might be realized, if this would be the most efficacious
tack a reasonable seller would take to maximize his net return on the
sale. This approach would seem especially appropriate when the
value of an item in a strictly local market is extremely low due
to an unusually light demand for items of this type which is peculiar
to the immediate locale.4 5
The dominant theme of the amendment is the application of the
replacement cost test to those items generally obtained by the public
in the retail market.46 Items commonly acquired in other channels
will apparently be valued by a different method which as yet remains
unstated.47 Yet another ambiguity is inherent in the requirements of
the subsequently released T.I.R., which provided that an actual
sale price be presumed to be the fair market value only where the
REv. BULL. No. 27, at 13-15. Commentators prior to the amended regulations deemed
it desirable to take some account of the effect of location on valuation and some
writers suggest that locale has often been an ad hoc consideration. "The effect of
location on valuation has not, however, been clearly articulated by legal authorities
due perhaps to the fact that it is usually assumed without much specific discussion.
Ordinarily it would appear that property should be valued according to its value at
the place where it is located unless it is of a type whose value is not affected by local
conditions." LOWNDES & KRAMER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 18.8, at 437-38.
43For example, the market for some widely held securities is at least national
in scope, while that for most realty will probably be more local in nature.
" The standard for this test would be the behavior of a reasonable seller intent
on maximizing his net return from the sale of the property in question.
5 Demand may be very slight for arctic clothing in Florida or tobacco cultivation
equipment in Wyoming.
46 See note 6 supra.
47 A possible alternative method is valuation based on the cash surrender value of
the article, also known as the money's worth or the seller's test. See notes 25-26
supra and accompanying text. Another alternative is valuation in accordance with the
special personal value to the recipient. See 2 BONBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 9, at 694-
95. The Commissioner may be willing to retain the pre-amendment compromise
approach to valuation, see note 5 supra, since the method for determining the relevant
market for items not generally obtained in a retail market might be difficult to
articulate.
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item sold is both tangible personalty generally obtained at retail
and is "frequently" sold at public auction or through classified news-
paper advertisement. 48 The market standards established by these
provisions are, at best, vague guidelines for the taxpayer. Precise
delineations as to how often articles from a class of items must be
disposed of to be considered "frequently" or "generally" sold are
left uncharted,49 and delimitation will probably vary with the dif-
fering characteristics of each type of property. Further, items "fre-
quently" or "generally" sold in the prescribed manners in one part
of the country may be marketed by divergent methods in another.
An additional consideration which poses interpretative prob-
lems is the proviso that a sale must be "bona fide" in order to qualify
for the sale price presumption under the terms of the T.I.R. 50 A
sale to a family member or some other interested party5 1 at a small
public auction, or a sale which occurs unreasonably soon after the
publication of a classified advertisement may cast suspicion on the
bona fides of the sale. A careful executor might avoid such antici-
pated objections by utilizing methods to publicize the auction which
are commonly used in the area and by insuring that his advertise-
ments were placed in appropriate newspapers for a reasonable time
before conclusion of a sale. -52
Finally, an interpretative problem is suggested by that provision
of the amended regulations which allows an administrative expense
48 T.I.R. 737, § 3, Rev. Proc. 65-19, 1965 INT. RIV. BuLL. No. 27, at 19.
4 Ibid. The precise meaning of the words "generally" and "frequently" as used in
the T.I.R. are not specified. However, it is obvious that they are not considered
mutually exclusive terms given the language that items "generally available . . . at
retail establishments, frequently are obtained . . . at a public auction or through
sales which result from advertisements placed in the classified section of a news-
paper." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) Whatever meaning may be drawn from the literal
wording of the T.I.R. itself, its ultimate effect will be largely determined by the
intent of the Commissioner in formulating it. The provision applies only to tangible
personalty, perhaps because of the difficulty in distributing such property among
general legatees and the likelihood that a sale will result. The generally and frequently
requirements may be designed to further restrict the application of the provision,
perhaps to personal effects, household furnishings and other such articles of per-
sonal use that may have little monetary value to a legatee.
"o Ibid.
51 E.g., a business associate, Du Pont v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 623 (1941); relative, Schoenheit v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 33
(1928), aff'd sub nom. Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1930); friends, Young
v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 656 (1927); or a member of executor's family, McWilliams
v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947); Shethar v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1222 (1957).
6 It is suggested that a reasonable seller test be adopted in this area also, see note
44 supra. Thus, if a reasonable seller would have made such a sale while bent on
maximizing his return, it will be accepted as bona fide.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
deduction where there is a sale to a dealer which is deemed "neces-
sary."'53 The factual question of a sale's necessity may pose difficul-
ties in several situations. For example, it is doubtful that a sale
which is made to facilitate the distribution of estate property will
qualify.54 The problem of securing sufficient funds to meet admin-
istrative expenses, debts and tax liability varies with the particular
characteristics of each estate, and the degree of difficulty which an
executor must show he has encountered in meeting these payments
without selling estate property remains unspecified.5
In addition to the interpretative problems, the amended regu-
lations suggest certain tax avoidance devices heretofore unavailable
to the taxpayer. For example, to mitigate the effect of the retail
market approach an executor might first meet estate expenses by
selling to a dealer those items of tangible personalty which are
rarely sold at a public auction or through classified advertisements. 0
This would afford him a necessary sale deduction under some cir-
cumstances57 and thereafter he could sell remaining articles of tan-
gible personalty at an auction or through classified advertisements
and thus achieve the benefit of the presumption that the sale price
obtained is the fair market value of an item. 8 Whether such a gam-
53 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053 (d) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. Rxv. BULL.
No. 27, at 14. This deduction permits avoidance of the harsh effects of the retail
market standard under conditions where a sale is pragmatically necessary. The intricate
procedure followed for the necessary sale deduction reaches basically the same result
as does that outlined in T.I.R. 737 in that it treats the sale price as the presumed
fair market value. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra. This is not to say that
the two approaches may in the necessary sale context reach the same result, because
they operate under different circumstances. However, the procedures reach similar
results. Assuming an article with fair market value of $100 is sold for $80, the re-
sulting taxable amount included in the estate will be $80 whether the value of the
article is taken as $80 or the value is taken to be $100 and a deduction of $20 is al-
lowed. The income tax consequences would be quite different, however, if the
executor should elect to take the deduction in the tax return for the income tax of the
estate. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, § 642 (g).
" The regulation requires a sale "necessary ... to effect distribution." Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2053-3 (d) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965 INT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 14.
(Emphasis added.) A sale which merely facilitates convenience of distribution would
thus not appear to qualify, although an executor might attempt to establish the
necessity for such a sale on other than financial grounds. Efforts to avoid contest of
the will by placating legatees might be interposed as "necessary."
5 In this case a suggested standard might hypothesize a reasonable executor at-
tempting to meet the obligations of the estate. However, this reasonable executor
would probably be precluded from using tax avoidance possibilities to influence
his decisions.
"If such articles are rarely sold in these manners they could not qualify for the
sale price presumption under T.I.R. 737.
57 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
" In the gift tax field, valuation considerations may encourage a prospective
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bit will prove successful may turn on judicial willingness to deter-
mine "necessity" by examining only those circumstances which are
manifest at the time of the sale-for-expenses. By taking an overview
of the entire pattern of estate disposition, sales which are in sub-
stance convenient tax mitigation devices may be treated as such
rather than as "necessary."'' 9
Under the regulations prior to these amendments, fair market
value was in practical effect largely a product of negotiation and
compromise. 60 The amended regulations have done little to alter
this practice since valuation problems have merely been placed in
a retail market setting. Moreover, several new interpretative prob-
lems and tax avoidance methods are foreseeable under the amend-
ments. Since the valuation process is one not readily adaptable to
donor to sell those articles not especially desired by the prospective donee, and then
make the gift of the proceeds of the sale, unless income tax consequences to the
donor dictate otherwise. In the case of tangible personalty he could then be sure
that the taxable value of the gift would not be far above its worth to the donee.
The effect of the amended regulations is to discriminate by means of higher tax
valuation against items of property specifically bequeathed or donated since the exec-
utor of a solvent estate will not have the option to sell such items to achieve the
favorable presumption or expense deduction and the donee may sell the property
for much less than the value put upon it for the gift tax.
50 In granting relief to what may be considered the harsh result of replacement
cost valuation, the necessary sale expense deduction, see notes 13, 53 supra, may also
strengthen the traditional position of the Commissioner in opposing blockage. See
note 36 supra and accompanying text. The regulations now provide for tax relief
whenever a "necessary" sale to a dealer results in realization of less than the fair
market value of the items sold. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 (d) (2) (1958), as amended, T.D.
6826, 1965 INT. Rv. BULL. No. 27, at 14. There is no exclusive categorization of items
which qualify for this necessary sale treatment, and the sale of securities is arguably
subsumed within the provision. Therefore, in a blockage situation where a "neces-
sary" sale was actually made, deductive relief might be appropriate. An administrative
expense equal to the amount that might have been realized but for the operation of
the blockage element in lowering the price of the securities could be allowed. Under
this approach, blockage would still be utilized to determine valuation where the
securities are held by the estate or are sold in an "unnecessary" sale that does not
qualify for the deduction, since the regulations accepting the blockage principle
are unaffected by the recent amendments. However, this result appears anomalous
since it permits valuation of securities in some situations based on a hypothetical
sale in a secondary market, while an actual sale of other items of estate property to
a dealer is not determinative of fair market value. If the Commissioner sees fit to
revoke his blockage regulations, the amended regulations could be utilized by an
estate where an actual necessary sale has occurred, and to justifiably deny the invo-
cation of blockage where the securities are retained or sold in a situation where the
sale is not "necessary."
However, by using the alternate valuation date, INT. Rxv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2032, any
executor who is willing to sell securities at a lower figure could avoid the blockage
problem entirely by selling the stocks within one year after the decedent's death and
taking that sale price for valuation.
00 See note 5 supra.
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a definitive treatment,61 it may be desirable to leave these and future
problems to the process of adjustment between the taxpayer and the
Internal Revenue Service agents rather than to formulate additional
''clarifications."
"" 'Value' is not a single purpose word. Men have all but driven themselves mad
in an effort to definitize its meaning. The problem arises in its most perplexing form
when ... property has not in fact been sold and an effort is made to ascertain what
it would have fetched if it had been sold. ... '[V]alue' almost always 'involves a guess,
a prediction, a prophecy....'" Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.)
(Frank, J.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 748 (1943). Perhaps the most cogent observation
is that "valuation is at best an opinion or guess ... LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFt TAXEs § 18.16, at 444 (2d ed. 1962).
